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Subsidiaries have access to different types of resources and therefore perform differently in 
their market place and within the MNC. Yet, even though subsidiaries are the object of 
intense interest, remarkably little has been written about the assessment of subsidiary 
performance. In short, the strategic opportunities of subsidiaries seem to generate more 
attention in the literature than their results. The two distinctive features of this paper are the 
development of the concept of subsidiary performance and the exploration of the linkage 
between subsidiary business context and performance. More specifically, by drawing on the 
literature about organizational learning, absorptive capacity and embeddedness in business 
relationships, some hypotheses will be formulated about the causal link between subsidiary 
environment and subsidiary performance. These hypotheses are then tested in a LISREL-
model based on data concerning 98 subsidiaries belonging to Swedish multinationals. 
 Our empirical results indicate that technology embeddedness has a positive, direct, 
impact on subsidiary market performance, and a positive, but indirect, impact on subsidiary 
organizational performance.  
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Introduction 
Subsidiaries within an MNC are not just the long-arm of the headquarters and they differ in 
terms of history, contexts, capabilities and organizational roles. Furthermore some 
subsidiaries become more important for the MNC than others. 
This acceptance of the strategic roles of subsidiaries raises a difficult question: how is 
the performance of a subsidiary to be evaluated? Performance evaluation, never an easy task, 
becomes exceptionally difficult in the case of subsidiaries. Subsidiaries are part of an MNC, 
which has its own objectives in establishing them, but the subsidiaries themselves have their 
own objectives that do not necessarily coincide with the objectives of the MNC. Subsidiaries 
have ambiguous goals of which conventional performance appraisals tend to be misleading. 
This paper proposes an alternative framework for measuring subsidiary performance that aims 
to capture some of the ambiguity of subsidiary goals. Subsidiary performance is 
conceptualised as the performance of a subsidiary in its own market place as well as its 
performance within the MNC in terms of its influence on the MNC’s strategic decision-
making. 
An obvious question is then: which factors determine the subsidiary performance? The 
intention of this paper is not to give an exhaustive description of all the factors that determine 
subsidiary performance. The aim is more modest. It will deal with those differences in 
subsidiary performance that are consequences of differences in the business networks 
surrounding the subsidiaries. More specifically, by drawing on literature about organizational 
learning, absorptive capacity and embeddedness in business relationships, some hypotheses 
will be formulated about the causal link between subsidiary environment and subsidiary 
performance. The hypotheses are tested on extensive data for 98 subsidiaries belonging to 
Swedish multinationals. 
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The first section of the paper will deal specifically with the theoretical and empirical 
implications of including subsidiary performance as a dependent variable. In the following 
section we discuss the causal links between technology-related embeddedness, the 
subsidiary’s absorptive capacity and its performance. The section concludes with a structural 
model comprising four latent constructs and four hypotheses. The third section presents the 
data and methods used to testify the hypotheses in a LISREL-analysis, while the fourth 
section presents the results. The article rounds up with a discussion of the theoretical and 
managerial implications of our results. 
Subsidiary Performance 
Some subsidiaries in the MNC have a strategic role in the organisation that goes beyond the 
traditional role of exploiting the parent company’s firm-specific advantages (Birkinshaw & 
Morrison, 1996). It is recognised that subsidiaries follow different strategies and obtain 
different roles in the MNC. Jarillo and Martinez (1990), for example, identified three strategic 
roles for subsidiaries that mirrored Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) multinational types and 
Porter’s (1986) multinational strategies. There is no shortage of research dealing with 
subsidiary strategies and subsidiary roles (for an overview of the extensive literature see 
Birkinshaw and Morrison (1996) or Taggart (1998)). Yet, even though subsidiaries are the 
object of intense interest, remarkably few of these publications address performance 
assessment. Most of them discuss typologies of subsidiary strategies or subsidiary 
characteristics associated with the different subsidiary strategies/roles. In short, the strategic 
opportunities of subsidiaries seem to generate more attention than their results. 
However, different bodies of literature have touched upon the study of the subsidiary 
performance per se by comparing the performance of foreign subsidiaries with either 
domestic firms in the host country or other entry modes. In studies comparing the 
performance of subsidiaries and domestic firms, it is suggested that the performance of 
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foreign subsidiaries is superior to that of domestic firms because of their possessions of firm-
specific advantages in the MNC (Caves, 1982). The essential argument is that tangible and 
intangible assets are deployed profitably abroad after being developed domestically (Dunning, 
1988). Most studies measure the subsidiary performance in terms of financial performance 
(e.g. profit rate and return on equity) and most of them find that subsidiaries are performing 
better than domestic firms (Globerman & Meredith, 1984). 
The main question investigated in the studies that have linked entry mode choice to 
performance is whether different ownership-based entry modes (typically joint ventures 
versus wholly owned subsidiaries) have characteristics which lead to different outcomes in 
terms of performance (Nitsch et al., 1996). These studies often rely on a transaction cost 
analysis of the different entry modes, predicting the entry mode’s relative performance on the 
basis of their anticipated costs (resource commitment costs and managerial control costs). In 
these studies the performance of the entry modes has been assessed by a large array of 
evaluation criteria, e.g., profitability, growth, market access, longevity, and management 
assessment of success (for an overview of this literature see Chowdhury, 1992).  
These studies have explored subsidiary performance from a comparative perspective 
with the aim of examining the characteristics that distinguish the performance of subsidiaries 
from other (domestic) firms or other entry modes. However, the aim of this paper is to explore 
the subsidiary performance per se, i.e., the characteristics that distinguish the performance 
among the subsidiaries. The essential question is rather: why are some subsidiaries 
performing better than others do? 
 The sparseness of literature on subsidiary performance per se is striking when 
compared with the considerable volume of literature on joint venture (JV) performance. In a 
review of the empirical literature on joint venture performance Blanchot and Mayrhofer 
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(1997) were able to identify 51 empirical investigations dealing with determinants of JV 
success.   
One explanation for this apparent lack of interest is circumstantial, since it is 
notoriously difficult to get subsidiary performance data. Different national financial reporting 
conventions, the reluctance of parent firms to divulge non-consolidated data, and the 
problems of reconciling internal data from different firms even when they are obtainable, are 
some of the reasons why subsidiary performance has not been explored more fully. A second 
reason may be conceptual problems related to the measurement of subsidiary performance.  
The debate over subsidiary performance measures is clearly a sub-set of wider concerns 
considering the assessment of company performance in general, and of which the evaluation 
of subsidiary performance is a particular challenge. The measurement of company 
performance is a controversial area (Chakravarthy, 1986; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986; 
Anderson, 1990; March & Sutton, 1997). A major problem is the choice of an appropriate 
yardstick(s) when assessing performance. Essentially, this debate concerns the 
appropriateness of traditional financial measures (e.g., return on equity or growth) as the 
providers of a unique measure of performance, versus the relevance of other indicators (like 
qualitative returns to the stakeholders, such as employee and customer satisfaction). A further 
issue is the question of short-term performance contra long-term performance. A firm can 
score well on current profit, yet score poorly on factors like investments and employee 
satisfaction, which tend to show up in poor performance at a later date (Anderson, 1990).  
In this setting of subsidiary performance there are some additional challenges. 
Subsidiaries are distinguished from independent firms by their relationships with an MNC. 
MNCs have their own objectives in creating subsidiaries, and obviously a subsidiary’s 
performance measured against these objectives is relevant. But it is not the only basis for 
measuring performance. Subsidiaries have their own strategies and objectives that do not 
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always coincide with the objectives of the MNC. Subsidiaries are independent and dependent 
at the same time. They operate as independent actors in the market place where they establish 
relationships with counterparts like suppliers and customers, but they are also dependent on 
the strategic decisions within the MNC when it comes to allocation of resources (e.g. 
investments and the location of production) inside the MNC. Some researchers have 
emphasised that an important feature of subsidiaries is that they are embedded in two 
distinctly different business networks: the corporate network consisting of relationships 
within the MNC and the external network comprised of relationships in the subsidiary’s local 
market (Andersson & Forsgren, 1995). 
We argue that subsidiaries seek to perform well in both the local market place and in the 
corporate network, the latter being where the political process for making strategic decisions 
within the MNC is based. Along with Forsgren et al. (1999) we use the terms: market 
performance and organizational performance for these two different, but related, types of 
subsidiary performance. The market performance is the performance in the market place 
where the subsidiary competes with all other companies, while the organizational 
performance is the performance in the political process inside the MNC, where the subsidiary 
aims to influence strategic decisions of relevance to the subsidiary.  
Our dependent variable for subsidiary performance consists, therefore, of two different 
dimensions: the market performance and the organizational performance. As mentioned 
above, there is a long tradition in the literature for measuring market performance. However, 
because firms are reluctant to provide information about their transfer pricing practices, tax 
considerations and other financial transactions inside the MNC, the traditional financial 
measures seem even more questionable and inappropriate when it comes to subsidiary 
performance. Instead, measures like sales volume and market share expansion seems more 
appropriate as measures of the market performance. 
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 In the related literature on JV performance, several researchers have turned to 
perceptual measures of the performance because of the concerns over the ability of objective 
measures to capture the performance (for example Blanchot & Mayrhofer (1997) lists 24 
studies that apply perceptual measures of JV performance). It has also been shown that 
perceptual measures tend to have a high correlation with objective, accounting based, 
measures (Geringer & Hebert, 1991). 
We can also actually argue that perceptual measures provide a better yardstick than 
objective ones, first of all, because in our analysis we posit that performance is an outcome of 
the subsidiary’s present business network involvement. However, since the advantages of 
being embedded in the particular network will materialize over time rather than instantly the 
expected market performance rather than the present market performance should constitute 
our dependent variable.  
Furthermore, if goal attainment is at the heart of a subsidiary’s market performance we 
should also maintain that it is the future market performance rather than the present market 
performance, which should be assessed (Anderson, 1990). Therefore in our analysis below we 
use the performance in terms of future sales and market shares, as perceived by divisional 
managers, in order to catch subsidiary market performance. 
A subsidiary’s organizational performance should reflect the extent to which that 
subsidiary can influence the allocation of investment resources and other strategic decision 
processes within the MNC. In most definitions of intraorganizational power it is assumed that 
power does not have to be exercised in order to exist (Provan et al., 1980). Therefore, the 
most common way to measure influence is to ask people within the organization how much 
influence a certain unit has over other units’ behaviour Such perceptual measures are likely to 
reflect both enacted and potential influence (Provan et al., 1980). Consequently, in our 
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conceptualization of a subsidiary’s organizational performance, other managers’ assessment 
of how much influence the subsidiary has over certain decisions within the MNC will be 
applied. 
Technology, embeddedness and performance 
Many researchers have pointed out that a unit’s performance is contingent on its ability to 
obtain valuable resources from the environment. For instance, resource dependence theory 
stresses the ability to cope with strategic interdependencies in the environment as a crucial 
factor for its performance in the market place (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967; Jacobs, 1974; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In contingency theory, survival and success is dependent on the 
unit’s responses to diverse environments (Lawrence & Lorch, 1967; Stopford & Wells, 1972; 
Galbraith, 1973; Egelhoff, 1988). The importance of the ability to obtain resources from the 
environment is also apparent in theories which deal with factors behind a unit’s power within 
an organization (Crozier, 1964; Hickson et al., 1971; Provan et al., 1980; Pfeffer, 1981; 
Krackhardt, 1990). Theories focusing on geography in an organizational context also 
emphasize the importance of the firms’ ability to selectively tap the environment for 
knowledge (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Amin & Thrift, 1994; Porter, 1990; Sölvell & Zander, 
1995). 
Later writings about organizational learning explicitly focus on the firm’s ability at all 
levels to acquire new knowledge from the environment (see e.g. Levitt & March, 1987; Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). Cohen & Levinthal (1990) coined the term absorptive capacity of a firm. What is 
meant by absorptive capacity is the firm’s ability to recognize the value of new, external 
information, and its ability to assimilate it and apply it to a commercial end. This ability is 
assumed to be crucial for the firm’s competitive advantage. Firms learn from each other and 
the efficiency of such a learning process is dependent on the characteristics of the 
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relationships the focal organization has with other organizations. For instance, in the literature 
about strategic alliances, the focus has shifted from traditional resource or risk-sharing 
alliances to alliances where the primary benefit is learning (Hamel, 1991; Dunning, 1996; 
Kumar & Nti, 1998). Through learning in the alliance the firms can acquire and exploit 
knowledge developed by others, which often allows the firms to respond more quickly to 
market changes than their rivals. 
The acquisition of external knowledge through interorganizational learning can be 
carried out in different ways. However, a basic distinction can be made between passive and 
active learning. Passive learning means acquiring objective and observable facts of the other 
firm’s capability. This learning occurs at arms-length and only the most visible parts of 
another firm’s knowledge can be acquired. Active learning, on the other hand, means also 
acquiring tacit knowledge embedded in a firm’s social context which is, therefore, more 
difficult for others to imitate (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). It is difficult to acquire such 
knowledge without having an interactive relationship with the other firm, built on trust, 
personal ties, relation specific investments and path dependence (Håkansson, 1989; De Laat, 
1997; Uzzi, 1997; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). If we assume that the acquisition of tacit, non-
imitable, knowledge is crucial for a firm’s competitive advantage, we can state that the quality 
of the relationships with other firms is of decisive importance. 
Such a characterisation of relationships, networks and social capital also has much in 
common with Polanyi’s (1957) and Granovetter’s (1985, 1992) discussion of embeddedness. 
By using this concept they argue that economic transactions between two actors are more or 
less embedded in a social and cultural context with mutual adaptation of the partners’ 
perspectives, interests and resources occurring over time. This concept has been used lately to 
discuss, for instance, the connection between environment and the subsidiary-headquarters 
relationships in MNCs (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996, 2000) and the allocative efficiency 
 10 
among entrepreneurial firms (Uzzi, 1996, 1997). That the embeddedness aspect is very much 
in line with the discussion of a firm’s absorptive capacity is apparent in Cohen and 
Levinthal’s (1990) notion that such a capacity is something that develops over time, is path 
dependent and therefore builds on prior knowledge of another organisation’s capacity. 
Different scholars have used the concept of embeddedness in market exchange. 
However, it has been used most explicitly by those working with theories about business 
networks (see e.g. Johanson & Mattsson, 1987; Axelsson & Easton, 1992; Forsgren & 
Johanson, 1992; Nohria & Eccles, 1992; Håkansson & Snehota, 1995; Ebers, 1997; Ford, 
1997; Uzzi, 1997). Research within this tradition has indicated that a limited number of 
market relationships often play a decisive role for a firm’s business (Hallén, 1986; 
Cunningham & Homse, 1986; Cowley, 1988). It has also been shown that these relationships 
are not only highly embedded, but that they are also critical for the firm’s technological 
development (von Hippel, 1978; Lundvall, 1988; Håkansson, 1989).  A firm has exchanges 
with many counterparts in its business network, but some exchanges are more embedded than 
others are in terms of mutual adaptation, trust and relation-specific investments.  
By combining the notion of embeddedness in business network theory with the 
discussion of organizational learning and the capacity to absorb new technology, we can 
conclude that the latter capacity is dependent on the degree of embeddedness in specific 
relationships of the firm’s business network. The more a certain relationship with a customer, 
supplier or some other counterpart has developed into a close relationship, the higher the 
possibility of a firm to acquire new knowledge through exchange with this counterpart. 
The notion of embeddedness in a business network setting includes different types of 
embeddedness, for instance technological, social or political embeddedness (Halinen and 
Törnroos, 1998). In this paper, the focused question is the subsidiary’s ability to absorb new 
technology from the environment. We have therefore chosen to concentrate on technological 
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embeddedness, that is dependencies between firms in a business network related to e.g. 
product development or production process development. This is not to argue that social or 
political dimensions of embeddedness are unimportant for the subsidiary’s ability to absorb 
new technology. On the contrary, social embeddedness is maybe an antecedent or prerequisite 
for technological embeddedness. However, it is reasonable to assume that activity links 
between firms related to technology are decisive factors behind the firms’ ability to absorb 
new technology from each other. 
The technological embeddedness of a subsidiary is therefore crucial for its ability to 
acquire external knowledge about new technology. Further, if we assume that technology 
development is a key resource of economic growth and competitive advantage (Mansfield, 
1968; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990; Chesnais, 1986; Dosi et al., 1988; De Meyer, 1992) we can 
conclude that technology embeddedness is positively related to the subsidiary’s market 
performance. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis1: A subsidiary’s technology embeddedness is positively related to its 
expected market performance 
It has been pointed out by several researchers that the subsidiary of an MNC can have 
different roles due to the characteristics of its environment, the subsidiary’s own initiatives or 
because of an assignment given by the headquarters (for an overview see Birkinshaw and 
Hood, 1998a & 1998b). A crucial question is how the individual subsidiary contributes to the 
firm-specific advantage of the whole MNC and type of relationships with sister units. For 
instance, one subsidiary can have a more innovating role in terms of development of new 
products and processes, while another subsidiary can have the role of an implementer (Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 1994). Some subsidiaries are more autonomous with global responsibility 
for a product while other subsidiaries are more integrated into the rest of the MNC (Forsgren 
and Pedersen, 1998). 
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From this follows that market performance at the subsidiary level, in terms of profits, 
market shares or sales growth, can be more or less important as an indicator of the fulfillment 
of the subsidiary role. However, that does not conceal the fact that in most cases an MNC is 
heavily dependent on the individual subsidiaries’ market performance. A high market 
performance attracts headquarters’ and other subsidiaries’ interests, because it reflects the 
subsidiary’s ability to obtain financial resources from the environment and its possibility to 
contribute to the MNC’s economic well being. The readiness to listen to strategic views held 
by such a subsidiary is probably higher than if held by a low-performing subsidiary, even 
though market performance may not fully reflect the subsidiary’s primary or strategic role. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that, ceteris paribus, a subsidiary’s expected 
performance have a positive impact on its organizational performance. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis2: The subsidiary’s expected market performance will be positively related 
to its organizational performance 
On the basis of our discussion above of technology embeddedness and absorptive capacity we 
would also expect that subsidiary environments differ in terms of their perceived strategic 
importance for the rest of the MNC, irrespective of their expected market performance. A 
subsidiary that has a high capacity to identify and assimilate knowledge about new 
technology, because of its technology embeddedness, will probably be considered important 
by the corporate headquarters. Such a subsidiary will be in a favourable position to affect the 
MNC’s strategic decisions. Consequently, we can formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: A subsidiary’s technology embeddedness is positively related to its 
organizational performance 
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However, if we base our reasoning on the assumption that intraorganizational power has to do 
with resource dependence, we would argue that the relationship between a subsidiary’s 
technology embeddedness and its organizational performance is contingent on the MNC’s 
dependence on the subsidiary. In resource dependence theory power is based on resource 
exchange between parties. That is, the more A is dependent on resource exchange with B, the 
higher B’s power is - enacted or potential - over A (Emerson, 1962; Blau, 1964; Cook & 
Emerson, 1984; Pfeffer, 1981; Krackhardt, 1990). Applied to the MNC, this would mean that 
the more the rest of the MNC is dependent on exchange of resources with a subsidiary, the 
greater the possibility that the latter can affect the MNC’s strategic decisions. Accordingly we 
can formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis4: A subsidiary’s technology embeddedness is positively related to its 
organizational performance if the corporation is dependent on the exchange of 
resources with the subsidiary   
 Hypotheses 1-4 are summarized in the following structural model. 
 
***************** 
Put Figure 1 here 
***************** 
It should be pointed out that the hypothesized relationship between technology embeddedness 
and subsidiary performance might be dominated by other factors like country policies or size 
and rate of growth of market. However technology embeddedness is a consequence of trust 
based relationships that have developed over the years rather than as a consequence of host 
country policies or size and growth rate of market. Consequently we assume that the impact 
of technical embeddedness on market performance can be studied independently of the impact 
from these other factors. It should also be mentioned that 84% of all the subsidiaries studied 
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are located within EU, with similar conditions in terms of market growth (varies only a few 
percent among the relevant EU-countries from 1990-95) and host country policies (e.g. 
general openness towards FDIs). 
The model in Figure 1 will be tested on data from Swedish MNCs. 
Data and method 
Data has been collected from 98 subsidiaries belonging to 20 international divisions within 15 
Swedish MNCs. The divisional headquarters are all located in Sweden. The majority of the 
subsidiaries are located in Europe and a few (five) in North America. The sample was chosen 
to represent a wide spectra of Swedish industry and involves large and well known companies 
in industries such as: pulp and paper, telecommunications equipment, petrochemicals, power 
distribution, hard metal tools, saws and chains, gas applications, transportation, software, 
management training and industrial equipment. The subsidiaries are among the most 
important and largest in their respective divisions. On average the subsidiaries in the sample 
account for over 50 per cent of the divisions’ combined operations, measured in terms of the 
number of employees. Their size varies from 50 to over 5000 employees. In five of the 
divisions, the subsidiaries investigated account for more than 80 per cent of the total 
operations, whilst they account for between 10 and 60 per cent in the remaining divisions. We 
have tried to increase the possibility of drawing general conclusions from the data gathered by 
selecting and including those subsidiaries that could be regarded as representative for the 
divisions’ business activities, in conjunction with the divisions’ headquarters. The largest 
division had more than 27,000 employees and the smallest about 300; the arithmetic mean 
was 5850 employees. Turnover ranged from 0.6 to 23 billion SEK; the average was about 6 
billion SEK. All divisions were highly international with, on average, more than 50 per cent 
of their employees outside Sweden. Taken together, the divisions had more than 100,000 
employees and an annual turnover exceeding SEK 100 billion.  
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 The subsidiaries investigated are responsible for their own production or are engaged in 
adaptation of the division’s products to the local market. In every subsidiary, therefore, the 
development of products and of the production processes is an important activity. All 
subsidiaries have a mixture of business relationships with external counterparts and sister 
companies. Although, the relationships to the sister units are not included in our sample, the 
subsidiaries studied have interactions with the rest of the division in addition to the 
administrative and legal links. 
The data collection was made through personal interviews with managers within the 
MNCs. However, before initiating the formal interviews, a pilot study was conducted. This 
study was made with managers in a large international pharmaceutical company with its 
headquarters in Sweden. Due to the pilot study a few questions were rephrased and some 
alterations in the sequence of the questions were made. The most important discovery from 
the pilot study was the significance of personal presence by the researcher as well as the need 
of a standardized questionnaire. Together this gave us the opportunity to explain the meaning 
of embeddedness and performance as well as to accomplish a reliable comparison between the 
different subsidiaries. In all, the questionnaires seemed to work very well according to our 
own judgement and the managers interviewed in the pilot study. 
In order to get valid and reliable assessments of the subsidiaries’ relationships; the 
interviews have been made with three different managers in each subsidiary, the CEO of the 
subsidiary, the sales manager and the manager responsible for purchasing. The sales manager 
and the manager responsible for purchasing were asked to describe and assess the three most 
important relationships with customers and suppliers respectively. The CEO of the subsidiary 
was asked to make the same description and assessment but for the three most important 
relationships besides those with suppliers and customers, e.g., competitors, government 
agencies, R&D laboratories, etc. The managers interviewed were asked to characterise the 
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relationship in focus according to a standardised questionnaire. The questions asked in the 
questionnaire and used as indicators of the latent constructs in this paper are depicted in Table 
1. A more thorough discussion about the questions and scales used in the paper is included in 
the subsequent section of construct analysis. 
After interviewing the subsidiary managers in one division, we turned to the 
headquarters and did a personal interview with the divisional manager, based on the same 
type of standardised questionnaire. Through these interviews we gathered information about 
the headquarters’ view of each subsidiary’s future market performance, their influence on 
strategic decisions and also the headquarters’ knowledge about the subsidiary’s specific 
business relationships. This can also be seen as a further validation of the questionnaire and 
increased reliability of the respondents’ answers. 
The study involved personal interviews with over 300 managers from leading positions 
in both the subsidiaries and the divisional headquarters. Each personal interview took between 
one and two hours with conceptual and interpretation problems in the questionnaire being 
discussed and explained. This discussion time during the interview clearly improves the 
reliability of the answers collected in comparison with, for example, a mail survey. 
A significant feature of this research is that the divisional managers assess the two 
dependent variables, expected market performance and organisational performance, while the 
subsidiary managers assess the two independent variables, subsidiary technology 
embeddedness and divisional dependence. Because of this, we avoid the potential bias that 
would arise in the data if the same person assessed both the dependent and the independent 
variables. The idea behind asking the divisional managers to estimate the subsidiaries’ 
performance is also that they are in a better position to make comparisons between 
subsidiaries than the subsidiaries themselves are. This approach is also in line with a common 
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method in studies of intra-organizational influence to ask other units about a focused unit’s 
performance, rather than the unit itself (see e.g Provan et al., 1980; Enz, 1989). 
Construct analysis 
The hypothesized model (Figure 1) was empirically tested in a LISREL model (Figure 2). The 
validity of LISREL models is estimated by the validity of the entire model, i.e., the 
nomological validity. The model is also validated by the extent to which the constructs are 
separated from each other, i.e., the discriminant validity, and the homogeneity of the 
constructs, i.e., the convergent validity. Chi-square (χ2) and a probability estimate (p-value) 
assess the overall fit of the LISREL model (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993:121). Together, the χ2 
and degrees of freedom, measure the distance between the proposed model and the data. The 
significance of the model is estimated by the p-value which should exceed 0.05 (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 1993). Convergent validity is judged by the R2-values, measuring the strength of the 
linear relationships, the t-values, a significance test of each relationship in the model, and the 
factor loading for each indicator (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993). The results of the validity test 
of the constructs are shown in Table 1. 
 To assess discriminant validity, a model with no causal relations between constructs (a 
so-called measurement model) is created. Our set of latent variables is discriminantly valid as 
key statistical estimates show that no pair of constructs is unidimensional. 
Missing values are accounted for in the analysis by pairwise deletion, so the number of 
missing values varies across variables. Pairwise deletion is applied primarily because there are 
few missing values and those that are, are sparsely distributed. 
Subsidiary technology embeddedness 
Technology embeddedness should reflect the value of a business relationship in terms of the 
subsidiary’s capacity to absorb new technology. Consequently, we need valid indicators of 
both technology development and embeddedness. It is often argued that development of 
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technology is reflected, above all, in a company’s development of new products and/or 
production processes (see, e.g., Mansfield, 1968). We have therefore chosen the development 
of new products and new production processes as our two indicators of technology 
development. More precisely, the subsidiary sales managers have been asked to assess to what 
extent a specific customer relationship has caused some adaptation of the subsidiaries’ 
technology development. In a similar fashion the sales managers have also been asked to 
identify how important a specific customer is for the subsidiary’s development activities. 
Corresponding questions have been put to the purchasing manager and the subsidiary CEO 
concerning suppliers and other counterparts, respectively. 
By combining the two indicators of embeddedness with the two indicators of 
technology development we get four indicators reflecting subsidiary technology 
embeddedness: (1) The counterpart’s importance for the subsidiary’s product development, 
(2) the counterpart’s importance for the subsidiary’s production process development, (3) the 
adaptation of the subsidiary’s product development to the specific relationship and (4) the 
adaptation of the subsidiary’s production process development to the specific relationship (see 
Table 1). A 5-point Likert scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = very much has been used for every 
indicator. By simply adding the scores of each of the subsidiary’s relationships, four 
indicators have been created which reflect the technology embeddedness of the subsidiary’s 
external network. 
It should also be pointed out that the emphasis has been on the subsidiary’s most 
important product or group of products in the interviews with the subsidiary managers. This 
means that all questions about business relationships, adaptation, importance, product 
development and production development refer to a specific product/market area rather than 
to the subsidiary’s total activity. This will certainly increase the relevance of our indicators 
and also improve the reliability of the answers given by the subsidiary managers.     
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The four indicators of subsidiary network embeddedness seem to be valid 
representations of a common construct. All key statistical measures are good. The t-values are 
above 8.01, the factor loadings are above 0.72, and the R2-values are above 0.52. The t-values 
and R2-values suggest good convergent validity of the construct (see Table 1). 
Expected market performance 
On the basis of our earlier discussion of a subsidiary’s market performance, we have chosen 
to use indicators reflecting managers’ perception of the subsidiary’s future performance. The 
divisional headquarters have been asked to estimate the future increase in sales and market 
shares for every subsidiary. Apart from the advantage of separating the responses relating to 
technology embeddedness from those concerning performance, the measure also has the 
virtue of giving the divisional headquarters the possibility to make comparisons across 
subsidiaries and countries. A 5-point Likert scale (1 = very small to 5 = very high) has been 
used to separate the answers. 
Key statistical measures, t-values above 5.82, R2-values above 0.64, and factor loadings 
over 0.80, show that the indicators are valid representations of the expected market 
performance construct (see Table 1). 
 
**************** 
Put Table 1 here 
**************** 
Organizational performance 
As the subsidiary’s relationships are analysed with respect to product and production 
technology/development, a very precise meaning of influence has been used, namely the 
subsidiary’s influence on decisions concerning new products or production processes and the 
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subsidiary’s influence on where to place production units. The latent construct is 
operationalized as the divisional headquarters’ assessment of the subsidiary’s influence on 
decisions concerning investments in new product lines and influence on where to place 
production units in the division. A 5-point Likert scale (1 = very low to 5 = very high) has 
been used. 
The two indicators of organisational performance seem to be valid representations of a 
common construct. The key statistical measurements are all good. The t-values are above 
5.38, the factor loadings are over 0.72, and the R2-values are above 0.52. The t-values and 
R2-values suggest good convergent validity of the construct (see Table 1). 
Divisional dependence 
Divisional dependence concerns the subsidiary’s sister units’ dependence on it for product 
and production development. The CEO of each subsidiary estimated the dependence. A Likert 
scale (1 = very low to 5 = very high) has been used. Indicators of the latent divisional 
dependence construct are shown in Table 1, which also shows that the key statistical measures 
are good. The indicator SIPN, has a factor loading of 0.87, a t-value of 4.59 and an R2-value 
of 0.87 and the indicator SIPT, has a factor loading of 0.51, a t-value of 3.85 and an R2-value 
of 0.51. As the subsidiary network embeddedness construct consists of the subsidiary’s 
business partners’ importance to the subsidiary in terms of product and production 
development and its adaptation of product and production technology, we want the divisional 
dependence construct, i.e., the subsidiary’s importance to other divisional units, to embrace 




Figure 2 reveals some very interesting results. First of all, Hypothesis 1 is supported. The 
subsidiary’s technology embeddedness has a clear impact on the subsidiary’s expected market 
performance. The data strongly support the view that the attributes of the subsidiary’s 
relationships with suppliers, customers and other actors in its environment are positively and 
significantly related to subsidiary’s expected market performance. This result is also in line 
with other research that relates performance to the ability to absorb new knowledge from the 
environment through the network of specific inter-organizational relationships. For instance, 
Powell et al. found empirical support for a positive relationship between rates of growth and 
network relationships among biotechnology firms (Powell et al, 1996). In a study of 489 
apparel firms Uzzi found a positive relationships between survival rate and degree of network 
embeddedness (Uzzi, 1996). A positive relationship between embeddedness and performance 




Put Figure 2 here 
**************** 
 
Second, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Expected market performance does not seem to have a 
significant impact on organisational performance. Or, expressed differently, a subsidiary can 
be expected to perform well in its market place without being influential within the MNC. A 
possible explanation is that market performance is a weak indicator of the subsidiary’s 
strategic role. This role, whether it is assigned by the headquarters or initiated and formulated 
by the subsidiary itself, differs between subsidiaries. However, it is this role, rather than its 
market performance that constitutes the base for organizational performance. Consequently, 
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the subsidiary can be successful in its market place but it does not as such improve its 
possibility to influence the strategic decisions within the MNC. 
Our result also indicates that there is no direct relationship between technology 
embeddedness and organisational performance, as Hypothesis 3 is not supported. The only 
causal link between embeddedness and organisational performance is through the MNC’s 
dependence on the subsidiary. This result confirms the relevance of the resource dependence 
theory in explaining intraorganizational influence of an MNC. Even if a subsidiary has a high 
degree of technology embeddedness in its external network and, therefore, a high expected 
market performance, it does not mean that it will perform well within the corporation, in terms 
of its influence on the strategic behaviour of the MNC. In accordance with Hypothesis 4, a 
necessary condition seems to be the MNC’s dependence on resources held by the subsidiary. 
Other explanations for the lack of support for Hypothesis 3 can be of motivational or 
cognitive nature, e.g., subsidiary management may have poor political skills or there may 
exist cognitive barriers that prevent the HQ from recognising the contribution of the 
subsidiary. Unfortunately our data does not allow us to control for the impact of these 
restraints on subsidiary organisational performance. 
We have also estimated a model where the insignificant relationships were omitted. No 
large changes on the estimates, largest change 0.04, or the t-values, largest change 0.23, could 
be traced. The change in the p-value is only 0.024, which is why we think that the model 
containing the insignificant relationships better visualises the analysis of the hypotheses. 
Our overall result leads us to conclude that a subsidiary’s ability to identify and 
assimilate new technology, and therefore its expected market performance, is associated with 
the degree of technology embeddedness of the subsidiary’s business network. But whether 
this also leads to organizational performance is contingent on the operational relationships 
between the subsidiary and the rest of the MNC.  
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Concluding remarks and managerial implications 
The focus of the paper has been subsidiary performance in an MNC context. Two distinctive 
forms of performance have been focused; market performance and organisational 
performance. The first form deals with how successful the subsidiary is in its market place, 
the second with how successful it is in the political process within the MNC. By drawing on 
business network theory, and the assumption that a subsidiary’s ability to absorb new 
technology from its environment is crucial for its performance, we have argued that 
differences in technology embeddedness can explain differences in performance among 
subsidiaries. 
This was also confirmed in our empirical study of 98 subsidiaries in Swedish 
multinationals. First, there was a positive and significant relationship between a subsidiary’s 
technology embeddedness and its expected market performance. This result indicates that a 
subsidiary’s access to relationships with specific counterparts is important for its absorptive 
capacity and, consequently, for its performance in the market place. 
Second, our results also suggest that there is a casual link between technology 
embeddedness and organisational performance, with the MNCs dependence on the focused 
subsidiary’s resources, rather than its market performance, as an intermediate variable. 
Our results have important managerial implications. First, we can conclude that the 
business network matters. It emphasizes that the management’s analysis of local 
environments, as a base for identifying differences between subsidiaries within an MNC, must 
include the business network surrounding the subsidiaries. Both at the subsidiary level and the 
corporate level, knowledge about the business network is crucial for understanding the basic 
capabilities of the MNC in general and of the individual subsidiaries in particular. 
Second, it stresses the importance of close relationships with other actors in the network 
for inter-organisational learning, competitive advantage and market performance. The 
corporate headquarters’ evaluation of the contribution of a subsidiary to the MNC’s 
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competitive advantage must include an analysis of the subsidiary’s business relationships and 
especially those, which are characterised by a high degree of embeddedness. 
This is in line with other research about the impact of business relationships on market 
performance (see, e.g., Dyer, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). The result does not imply that all 
relationships in a subsidiary business network must be highly embedded, but rather that some 
of them must have these characteristics if the subsidiary wants to absorb new technology from 
the environment. The possibility that a business network becomes too embedded and tightly 
structured has also been pointed out by several researchers (for a discussion of this problem, 
see e.g., Granovetter, 1973; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). A crucial task for 
management will be to handle the possible trade off between the flexibility connected to 
arms-length relationships and learning connected to embeddedness in relationships. But that 
does not contradict the fact that embeddedness is an important feature of the business network 
when we focus on absorption of new technology and subsidiary performance. 
The results suggest that an analysis of a subsidiary’s relationships with customers, 
suppliers etc is important also when a subsidiary’s power within the MNC is focused. These 
relationships are in themselves important resources on which the subsidiary can base its 
organisational performance. However, other MNC units’ dependence on the focal subsidiary’s 
activities is a necessary condition for intra-organisational power. A high market performance 
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Structural model showing the relations between Subsidiary Technology Embeddedness, Expected Market 

































The Constructs and their Indicators 
 
    Factor 
Indicator    Loading t-value R2-value 
 
Expected Market Performance 
How does the HQ judge this subsidiary’s future  0.91 5.85 0.84 
 increase in sales volume (SAVO) 
 
How does the HQ judge this subsidiary’s future  0.80 5.82 0.64 




The subsidiary generally has a considerable influence 0.87 5.38 0.75 
 on decisions concerning investments in new  
 product lines (IIVNP) 
 
The subsidiary highly affects where to place  0.72 5.50 0.52 
 production-units within the global division in  
 the next coming years (IPU) 
 
 
Subsidiary Technology Embeddedness 
To what extent is this counterpart important to  0.72 8.01 0.52 
 subsidiary’s product development? (IMPT)  
 
To what extent is this counterpart important to  0.83 8.83 0.70 
 the subsidiary’s production development? (IMPN) 
 
To what extent has the relationship with this  0.87 9.55 0.77 
 counterpart caused adaptation to the subsidiary’s  
 product development? (ADPT) 
 
To what extent has the relationship with this  0.76 8.48 0.57 
 counterpart caused adaptation to the subsidiary’s  




To what extent is this subsidiary important to other 0.51 3.85 0.51 
 divisional units product development? (SIPT) 
 
To what extent is this subsidiary important to other 0.87 4.59 0.75 
 divisional units production development? (SIPN) 
 
 






   IPU IIVNP SAVO MASEX SIPT SIPN IMPT IMPN ADPT ADPN 
 
IPU   1.00 
 
IIVNP   0.63 1.00 
 
SAVO -0.02 0.08   1.00 
 
MASEX -0.08 0.12   0.74   1.00 
 
SIPT   0.12 0.18 -0.03 -0.02 1.00 
 
SIPN   0.28 0.28 -0.02 -0.16 0.44 1.00 
 
IMPT -0.06 0.10   0.21   0.24 0.25 0.24 1.00 
 
IMPN -0.04 0.11   0.25   0.26 0.02 0.22 0.53 1.00 
 
ADPT -0.04 0.03   0.17   0.12 0.22 0.20 0.70 0.36 1.00 
 
































.38 (2.56) .25 (2.13) 







IIVNP SIPT SIPN 
 2  
Note: Model χ2 is 39.25 with 30 degrees of freedom, at a probability of 0.12. The figures given are factor 
loadings of causal relations with t-values in parenthesis. Error covariance for IMPN and ADPT, and 
MASEX and SIPN added. 
